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MASSACHUSETTS LAW-THE SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT Doc­
TRINE EXPANDS BEYOND LIFE-PROLONGING DECISIONs-In re 
Guardianship ofRoe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision; In re 
Guardianship of Roe, I significantly narrowed the scope of a guard­
ian's authority over his mentally ill ward. The central issue2 was 
whether the guardian of a mentally ill,3 noninstitutionalized4 ward 
possessed the inherent authority under the Massachusetts Guardian­
ship statute5 to consent to the forcible administration6 of antip­
sychotic medication7 in the absence of an emergency and against the 
wishes of the ward.s The court developed a set of guidelines which 
I. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 421 N.E.2d 40. 
2. Id. at 983, 421 N.E.2d at 42. On the collateral issue of the standard of proof in a 
permanent or temporary guardianship proceeding, the coun held that a permanent 
guardian may be appointed upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that an indi­
vidual is unable to care for himself by reason of mental illness and a temporary guardian 
be appointed upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the welfare of the 
mentally ill person requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian. Id. at 
993.421 N.E.2d at 47. . 
3. Id. at 983, 421 N.E.2d at 42. See generally Massachusetts Depanment of Mental 
Health Regulations, MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 104, § 3.01:I(a) (1979). The rule adopted a 
definition of mental illness for use in civil commitment and criminal commitment pro­
ceedings: "[A) substantial disorder of thought, mood. perception, orientation, or memory 
which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality or ability to meet 
the ordinary demands of life, but shall not include alcoholism." Id. 
4. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 983, 421 N.E.2d at 42. In limiting its decision. the coun 
declined "[t)o rule on the rights of patients confined against their will 10 State Hospitals 
to refuse antipsychotic medication." Id. at 1021.421 N.E.2d at 62. By implication, the 
decision of this coun applies to all individuals outside slate institutions. See MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § I (West Supp. 1982) (definition of mental health facility). 
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201 (West 1958 & Supp. 1982). 
6. Rogers v. Okin. 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361 n.1O (D. Mass. 1979), offd in pari, rer'd. 
in pari, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. , Mills v. Rogers, 102 
S. Ct. 2442 (1982) ("This term includes forced medication by injection and the threat 
thereof, upon refusal to take medication orally"). 
7. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 n.1 (I st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub 
nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982). 
8. 1982 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1007,421 N.E.2d at 54. "The coun adopts the dictionary 
version of 'emergency': An unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting 
state that calls for immediate action. Webster's Third Nell: 1m'I. Dictionary at 741 
(1961)". Id. at 1007,421 N.E.2d at 54. 
The coun went on to narrow the definition as follows, "in determining whether an 
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basically stated that absent the existence of an emergency, anti­
psychotic medication may be administered forcibly to a noninstitu­
tionalized ward only by court order, in' accordance with the 
principles of substituted judgment.9 
This note will analyze how the supreme judicial court in Roe 
has expanded the substituted judgment doctrine to include decisions 
to refuse extraordinary, that is, non-life-prolonging medical treat­
ment. The note also will demonstrate Roe's significance in the con­
text of the expanding rights of the legally incompetent in 
Massachusetts. 
II. FACTS 
When Richard Roe was seventeen or eighteen years of age, he 
was involved in a minor accident while under the influence of alco­
hol and marijuana. lo The automobile accident constituted a turning 
point in Richard's life because he strongly rejected the use of illicit 
drugs after this incident. I I In August of 1979, Richard was arrested 
on a charge of receiving stolen property. Following his appearance 
in court, Richard was committed for observation to Northampton 
State Hospital because his competency to stand trial was ques­
tioned. 12 During the observation, Richard refused all medication. 13 
He was found competent to stand trial and released from the 
emergency exists in tenns of requiring 'immediate action', the relevant time period to be 
examined begins when.the claimed emergency arises, and ends when the individual who 
seeks to act in the emergency could, with reasonable diligence, obtain judicial review of 
his proposed actions. Id ai 1008,421 N.E.2d at 55. 
g: Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), ajf'd in port, rev'd in port, 
634 F.2d .650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 
2442 (1982). The United States District Court in Rogers adopted a much clearer defini· 
tion than Roe, "a committed mental patient may be forcibly medicated in an emergency 
situation in .,.,hich a failure to do so .,.,ould result in a substantial likelihood ofphysico!. 
harm . ... " 478 F. Supp. at 1365 (emphasis added). 
9. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 999, 421 N.E.2d at 50·51. See infra notes 57·89 and 
accompanying text. 
The coun held that the guardian had not seasonably petitioned the probate 
coun for the authority to consent to the administration of antipsychotic medica· 
tion to the ward, Richard Roe, III, and thus vacated the probate coun's decree 
granting the guardian such authority. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1022,421 N.E.2d 
at 62. 
10. Brief for Appellant at 6, In re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 
421 N.E.2d 40 (Brief was unclear as to Richard's precise age on the date of the accident). 
II. Id at 7. "Ever since the auto accident Richard Roe III has remained steadfast 
in his opposition to drugs of any son." Id (emphasis added.) 
12. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 15(b) (West Supp. 1982). 
13. Brief for Appellant at 9. In re Guardianship of Roe. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981. 
421 N.E.2d4O. 
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hospital. 14 
In February of 1980, Richard was arrested and charged with 
attempted unarmed robbery and assault and battery.15 His compe­
tence to stand trial was questioned again and Richard was commit­
ted for observation and evaluation io Northampton state Hospital 
for a second time. 16 During this observation and evaluation, Rich­
ard was found to be incompetent to stand trial and committed for 
further observation and treatment. 17 In April of 1980, the superin­
tendent of Northampton State Hospital filed a petition for Richard's 
civil commitment. ls At the hearing, Richard was found not civilly 
committable. 19 During this period, Richard continued to refuse all 
proferred medication.20 His refusal of all antipsychotic medication 
was based upon prior experiences with illicit drugs21 as well as his 
acceptance ofcertain tenets of the Christian Science faith. 22 
14. Id. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § IS(b) (West Supp. 1982) (after a 
finding of competency to stand trial, the patient is released to the court). 
IS. Brief for Appellant at IO'/n re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh.o 981, 
421.N.E.2d 40. 
16. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 986, 421 N.E.2d at 44. 
17. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(b) (West Supp. 1982). 
18. Brief for Appellant at 10, In re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 
421 N.E.2d 40. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, §§ 7-8 (West Supp. 1982). "The 
superintendent of a facility may petition the district court . . . for the commitment to 
said facility and retention of any patient at said facility whom paid superintendent deter­
mines that the failure to hospitalize would create a likelihood of serious .harm by reason 
of mental illness." Id. § 7(a). "Whenever a court receives a petition filed under any 
provisions of this chapter for an .order of commitment of a person to a .facility ... such 
court shall notify the person, and pis nearest relative or guardian, or the receipt of such 
petition and of the date a hearing on such petition is to be held. The hearing shall be 
commenced within fourteen days of the filing of the petition unless a delay is requested 
by the person or his counsel" Id. § 7{c). "After a hearing, ... the district court shall not 
order the commitment of a person at a facility . . . unless it finds after a hearing that 
(1) such person is mentally ill, and (2) the discharge of such person from a facility would 
create a likelihood of serious harm." Id. § 8{a)." The first order of commitment of a 
person under this section shall be valid for a period of six months...." Id § 8(d). 
19. Brief for Appellant at IO,/n re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 
421 N .E.2d 40. 
20. Id. at 14. 
21. See supra note II and accompanying text. 
22. Brief fc' ~ .ppellant at 13-14, In re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. 981, 
421 N .E.2d 40. Richard's primary religious affiliation is with the Unitarian Church; 
however, during his secondperiod of observation at Northampton State Hospital, he ob­
tained a copy of Health and Science, a book by Mary Baker Eddy, in French, which he 
often referred 'to as "his Bible". Id. at 14. It should be noted, however. that in the pro­
bate court's subsidiary findings, there was not evidence that Richard understood the con­
text of the book. Appendix to Brief for Appellant at App. 26, In re Guardianship of Roe, 
1981 Mass Adv. Sh. 981, 421 N.E.2d 40. (subsidiary finding of the court No. 39). See 
general(y M. EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES (1875). 
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In March of 1980, Richard's father filed a petition for appoint­
ment as permanent guardian and a motion for temporary guardian­
ship as well.23 Following a hearing on the motion, Richard was 
found to be unable to care for himself by reason of mental illness 
and in immediate need of a temporary guardian.24 The father was 
appointed temporary guardian and was granted the authority to con­
sent to the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication, even 
though his motion did not seek such authority.25 The court ap­
pointedguardli7n adlilem,26 acting on behalf of Richard, filed a mo­
tion to stay the decree authorizing administration of the 
medication.27 The motion was allowed for t~n days by the probate 
judge and, at an appeals hearing before a single justice of the Massa­
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court,28 the stay was continued pending 
further review of the matter. 29 On July 30, 1980, the father was ap­
pointed permanent guardian by the probate court.30 In addition, the 
probate court granted to the father authority to consent to the forci­
ble administration of medication even though that authority was not 
requested in the petition.31 
The permanent guardian's authority to consent to the adminis­
tration of antipsychotic medication was stayed, however, under the 
previous order of the single justice.32 Both parties filed a joint mo­
23. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987, 421 N.E.2d at 44. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
201, §§ 6, 14 (West Supp. 1982). 
24. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987, 421 N.E.2d at 44. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
201, § 14 (West Supp. 1982) (temporary guardian). 
25. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987, 421 N.E.2d at 44. 
26. Id See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 34 (West Supp. 1982) (the court 
may, upon the representation of any party, including the court itself, appoint a guardian 
ad litem). One of the problems with the Roe. case was that it failed to define the role of a 
guardian ad litem in a substituted judgment proceeding. Traditionally, the guardian ad 
litem assumed a non-adversarial role in guardianship litigation. Usually, he conducts an 
investigation of the matter and based on his findings, makes a recommendation to the 
court. In a Roe type case, however, where there is an important privacy interest being 
protected, it would be important that the guardian ad hiem assume the role of an adver­
sary. Otherwise it is possible that. the authority sought by the petitioner will be granted, 
uncontested. if the guardian ad litem concludes that the authority is warranted. Contra In 
re Mary Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 567, 432 N.E.2d 712, 721 (1982). See generally Baron, 
Assuring "Detached by Passionate Investigation and Decision':' The Role of Guardian Ad 
Lliem in rhe Saikewicz-Type Cases, 4 AM. 1.L. & MED. III (1978); Cramer, Roles ojthe 
Guardian Ad Litem and Respondent's AI/orney, in MENTAL DISABILITIES-THE LEGAL 
RESPONSE 37 (1979). 
27. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987,421 N.E.2d at 44. 
28. Id See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211. § 3 (West Supp. 1982). 
29. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987, 421 N.E.2d at 44. 
30. Id See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201. § 6 (West Supp. 1982). 
31. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987. 421 N.E.2d at 44. 
32. Id at 987-88, 421 N.E.2d at 44. 
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tion on August 19, 1980, to transfer the case to the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court.33 The motion was granted and the case was 
argued before the court on October 9, 1980.34 
In its opinion, the supreme judicial court affirmed the probate 
court's decision to appoint Richard's father both temporary and per­
manent guardian.35 The court concluded, however, that the probate 
judge had committed an error in granting the guardian authority to 
consent to the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication 
because the father had not filed a petition with the probate court 
seeking an order directing that the medication be administered to the 
ward.36 Because no such request was before the probate judge, the 
order authorizing consent to administer antipsyhotic medication was 
premature and thus vacated by the supreme judicial court.37 · . 
Although the supreme judicial court could have disposed of the 
case on the above conclusion, the court went qn to establish guide­
lines for the making of a substituted judgment determination38 re­
garding the right to refuse antipsychotic medication, in an,ticipation 
of future litigation.39 
III. HISTORY OF THE LAW 
A. Massachusetts Law--Guardianship 
1. In General 
Historically in Massachusetts, guardianship has been viewed as 
a legal device to protect those individuals who are unable to care for 
33. ld at 988, 421 N.E.2d at 44. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211, §§ 3, 4(a) 
(West Supp. 1982). 
34. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 981, 421 N.E.2d at 40. Two intervening parties submit­
ted briefs in this opinion. On May 12, 1980, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office 
moved to intervene on behalf of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health. On 
September 9, 1980, Greater Boston Legal Services moved to intervene on behalf of the 
named plaintiffs in Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aJTd in part, rev'd 
in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102 
S. Ct. 2442 (1982). 
35. 1981 Mass. Ad\'. Sh. at 998, 421 N.E.2d at 50. 
36. Id at 998-99, 421 N.E.2d at 50. The father had sought a contingent authority 
to consent to the administration of antipsychotic medication if certain anticipated events 
took place. ld 
37. ld 
38. ld See infra notes 57-89 and accompanying text. 
39. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 999, 421 N.E.2d at 50. This opinion is not. however, an 
advisory opinion of the supreme judicial court. MASS. Cm'ST. pI. 2, ch. 3, art. 2. amend. 
art. 85. The guidelines set up by the supreme judicial court in Roe are not permissive but 
mandatory. 
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themselves.40 In the case of an individual with mental illness, the 
court, through authority granted by the legislature, "proceeded from 
a position ofparens patriae and required only a finding that the 'best 
interests' of the ward would be served by the appointment of a 
guardian,"41 and that the alleged ward be mentally ill.42 Once the 
guardianship had been granted, the guardian'S authority over the 
mentally ill ward was limited only by the requirement that the 
guardian act in the ward's best interests.43 
The trend in Massachusetts law over the past decade has been to 
limit the authority of the guardian over the ward and to give the 
ward self-authority consistent with his abilities.44 Three recent Mas­
sachusetts decisions have increased~significantly the due process pro­
tection afforded mentally ill wards by narrowly defining the 
standards required to establish a guardianship and limiting the dis­
cretionary authority of the guardian. 
The supreme judicial court decision, In re Bassell ,45 held that 
the probate court has the statutory authority46 to tailor a guardian­
ship both'by limiting the authority of the guardian and by allowing 
the mentally ill ward to exercise the maximum amount of self-re­
40. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) ("The whole theory of guardian­
ships is to protect the ward during his incapacity to protect himself'). Id. at 643-44. See 
generally Doe v. Doe, 377 Mass. 272, 273, 385 N.E.2d 995, 997(1979) (probate coun 
found that the alleged ward was in need of a guardian because of his inability to care for 
himself by reason of mental illness); Fazio v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 394, 403, 378 N.E.2d 951, 
957 (1978) (an alleged ward will be in need of a guardianship when it is shown that the 
alleged ward is unable to manage his own affairs by reason of mental illness); Guardian­
ship of Bassett, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 60-61, 385 N.E.2d 1024, 1027-28 (1979) 
(Belchenown State School Friends Association appointed to protect the welfare of the 
ward). 
41. Rogers, The COUrI's Consideration of Competence, in MENTAL DISABILITIES­
THE LEGAL RESPONSE I (1979) (footnotes omitted). "[T]he State has a traditional power 
and responsibility, under. the doctrine ofparens patriae to care for and protect the 'best 
interests' of the incompetent person." Superintendent of Belchenown State School v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977). See Rice v. Parkman, 16 
Mass. 326, 328 (1820) (the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, through the legislature, acts 
as the general guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act for themselves). 
See generally MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. I, an. IV, § I. 
42. See supra note 3. 
43. See supra note 41. 
44. Moriany, Guardianships of Mentally-III Persons: Recent Developments Re­
viewed, 26 BOSTON B.J. 10 (1980). 
45. 7 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 385 N.E.2d 1024 (1979). 
46. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215; § 6 (West Supp. 1982) ("Probate couns shall 
also have jurisdiction concurrent with the supreme judicial and superior couns, of all 
cases and matters in which equitable relief is sought relative to ... (vi) all matters rela­
tive to guardianship ..."). 
571 1983] MASSACHUSETTS UW 
sponsibility consistent with his abilities.47 In an'other decision, Doe I'. 
Doe ,48 the court held that for a guardian to admit or commit his 
ward to a state mental health facility, there must be a separate hear~ 
ing on that matter. Before authority to commit will be granted, the 
guardian must prove that the alleged ward meets the same criteria as 
that needed to civilly commit an individual.49 Finally, in Fazio v. 
Fazio,5o the supreme judicial court held that a potential guardian 
must establish the need for a guardianship by presenting evidence 
that: (1) The alleged ward is mentally ill; and (2) by reason of 
mental illness, the alleged ward is incapable of taking care of 
himself.51 
Coinciding with these judicial developments has been a dra­
matic increase in the number of guardianships granted in Massachu­
setts.52 The increase may be the result of a state policy toward 
deinstitutionalization53 and h~s resulted in an influx to the commu­
nity of individuals with mental illness, persons not totally able to 
--------------------------------------------.------_._--­
47. 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 62-64, 385 N.E.2d at 1029. The coun stated that there was 
no conftict between the guardianship statute and the exercise of the probate coun's equi­
table powers to limit guardianship authority to accommodate "a mentally retarded per­
son who lacks decision-making capacity as to some but not all of his personal affairs." 
Id at 63, 385 N.E.2d at 1029. 
48. 377 Mass. 272, 385 N.E.2d 995 (1979). 
49. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, §§ 6, 6A, 14 (West Supp. 1982) (as 
amended by Act of Sept. 29,1977, ch. 567, § 1,1977 MASS. ACTS 712. which allowed a 
coun order to admit or commit a mentally ill ward to a state facility. only if it was found 
to be in the mentally ill ward's "best interests"). 
Under the Doe decision, the statute was interpreted to mean that a mentally ill ward 
could no be admitted or committed to a state facility unless failure to admit or commit 
would create a "likelihood of serious harm", the same 'standard used under the civil 
commitment statute. 377 Mass. at 280, 385 N.E.2d iii 1000. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANl'. 
ch. 123, §§ 1,7,8 (West Supp. 1982) (definition of likelihood of serious harm). 
50. 375 Mass. 394, 378 N.E.2d 951 (1978). 
51. Id at 403, 378 N.E.2d at 957 ("[W]e think it reasonable to interpret the statu­
tory phrase 'incapable of taking care of himself by reason of mental illness' as encom' 
passing a general inability on the part of an individual to manage his own personal and 
financial affairs, such inability being caused by mental illness. We think the type of 
evidence necessary to suppon such a finding, apartfrom evidence 0/mental illness. should 
consist of facts showing a proposed ward's inability to think or act for himself as to 
matters concerning his person health, safety, and general welfare. or to make informed 
decisions as to his propeny or financial interests"). (emphasis added). See MASS. GEl'. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 6 (West Supp. 1982). . 
52. The number of guardianships granted over the mentally disabled increased 
from 516 in fiscal 1973, CHtEF JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURTS. STATISTICS AI'D RE­
PORT OF THE PROBATE COURTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS FOR 
YEAR 1973. at 9 (1974), to 1167 in fiscal year 1980, COMMONWEALTH REPORT OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT 1980. at 80. 83-84 (1981). an increase greater than IOQii(. 
53. See MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH. THE FIVE YEAR 
STATE PLAN FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES (1977). 
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care for themselves. The difficulty with this trend is the maintenance 
of proper supervision and care for these individuals. Unlike state 
hospitals, maintenance in the community is more difficult because 
the community lacks both the regimented lifestyle and physical 
structure of an institution. For those individuals in need of care and 
maintenance in the community, a guardianship provides a conve­
nient tool for accomplishing that end. Because the authority granted 
to a guardian is broad, the guardian is able to provide the necessary 
structure in the patient's life outside the state hospital, 54 an ability 
that may explain the increase in the number of granted 
guardianships. 
2. Substituted Judgment 
As the number of guardianships increase, however, the potential 
for abuse of the authority granted guardians also increases. 55 A ma­
jor area of potential abuse is the guardian's authority over the 'per­
son' of the ward.56 To deal with this problem, the supreme judicial 
court has developed the doctrine of substituted judgment. 
Briefly stated, a substituted judgment57 is the decision that 
54. See supra notes 58, 59, 61 and accompanying text. 
55. "There is an obvious need for broad, tlexible, and responsive guardianship 
powers, but simultaneoulsy rhere is a need ro avoid rhe serious consequences accompanying 
a wel/-inrenrioned bur mistaken exercise of those powers in making certain medical treat­
ment decisions." 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1002,421 N.E.2d at 52 (emphasis added). 
56. The authority to admit or commit a mentally ill ward was abused. The abuse 
ultimately resulted in the passage of an amendment to the guardianship statute to rectify 
the problem. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 6 (West Supp. 1982), as amended by Act 
of Sept. 29, 1977, ch. 567 § I, 1977 MASS. ACTS 712. See Doe v. Doe, 377 Mass. 272, 385 
N.E.2d 995 (1979). Another area of abuse is the right to refuse antipsychotic medication, 
which was dealt with partially by the Roe decision. Roe, however, left unanswered the 
question of whether a ward can be forcibly medicated without his consent in a state 
hospital without the benefit of the substituted judgment determination. 1981 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 1021,421 N.E.2d at 62. See Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982) (whether an 
institutionalized ward has the right to refuse antipsychotic medication is a matter of state 
law). 
57. The substituted judgment doctrine originated in early 19th Century English 
law. Ex parle Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (ch. 1816). Here, the court was concerned 
about a family putting their own interests before those of the mentally ill ward in the 
management of the latter's estate. Id. at 879. In its opinion, the court held that any 
decision regarding the practice of making an allowance to the immediate relatives out of 
the estate of the mentally ill ward should be made by the court in its discretion as the 
mentally ill ward would have acted if of sound mind. Id. See also In re Darling, 39 Ch. 
Div. 208, 213 (1888). 
The issue of estate management and allowances being taken out of the mentally ill 
ward's estate reached the United States Supreme Court in 1945. City Bank Farmers 
Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594 (1945). In this case, the Court held that a court is to 
substitute itself as nearly as possible for the ward, and to act upon the same motives and 
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would be made by a legally incompetent individual if that individual 
were competent.58 The substituted judgment decision is actually 
made by a probate court judge based on a number of factors, includ­
ing the ward's stated preferences. 59 
Three recent Massachusetts decisions, Superintendent of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,60 In re Dinnerstein,61 and In 
re Spring,62 have applied the substituted judgment doctrine to cases 
of life-prolonging medical treatment.63 In Saikewicz, the question 
was whether to administer chemotherapy to a severely retarded 
sixty-seven year old man suffering from leukemia.64 The Superin­
tendent of the Belchertown State School petitioned the probate court 
for a guardian for the patient and moved to appoint a guardian ad 
litem to make necessary treatment decisions about his leukemia.65 
The case presented a novel legal question for the supreme judicial 
court, which set out three principle areas of inquiry: 
considerations as she would have acted upon had she been competent to do so. Id at 
599. The first case in the United States to apply the substituted judgment doctrine to a 
matter relating to the guardian's authority over the person of a mentally ill ward oc­
curred in Kentucky. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). The issue in that case 
was whether the court had the power to permit the transplant of a kidney from a men­
tally ill ward to the body of his brother. Id at 145. As part of its analysis, the court 
determined that such power was granted to it under the substituted judgment doctrine. 
Id at 148. Furthermore, "[t)he right to act for the incompetent in all cases has become 
recognized as the doctrine of substituted judgment and is broad enough not only to cover 
property but also to cover all mailers touching on the well being 01the ward." Id (empha­
sis added). The only flaw in the Strunk case is that the court did not sufficiently consider 
the benefits to the mentally ill ward. Id at 151 (Steinfeld, J. dissenting). 
58. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 999, 421 N.E.2d at 52. 
59. Id at 1011-12,421 N.E.2d at 56-57. 
60. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
61. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978). 
62. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209,405 N.E.2d 115. 
63. Id at 1219-20,405 N.E.2d at 122; 373 Mass. at 751,370 N.E.2d at 431; 6 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 472-73,380 N.E.2d at 138. See Note, Right to Refuse M.edical Treatment­
Decisions to Terminate Life-Prolonging Treatment lor Incompetent Patients-In re 
Spring, 2 WEST. NEW ENG. L. REV. 759 (1980). 
In cases involving minor incompetents, Massachusetts courts have applied what 
amounts to a best interests test dressed in a substituted judgment's clothing. In other 
words, a substituted judgment would not consider what the minor would do if compe­
tent. Instead, the substituted judgment considers what is in the best interests of the in­
competent minor regardless of the minor's personal preferences. Custody· of a Minor, 
375 Mass. 733, 753, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (1978). See also Custody of a Minor, 385 
Mass. 697, 711,434 N.E.2d 601, 609 (1982); Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732,745, 393 
N.E.2d 836,844 (1979). 
64. 373 Mass. at 729-30. 370 N.E.2d at 419. The patient, Joseph Saikewicz, had 
been residing at the state school in Belchertown since 1928. Id at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420. 
In 1976 he was diagnosed as suffering from leukemia. Id 
65. Id at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419. 
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A. 	 The nature of the right of any person competent or incompe­
tent to decline potentially life-prolonging treatment. 
B. 	 The legal standards that control the course of decision 
whether or not potentially life-prolonging but not life saving 
treatment would be administered to a person who is compe­
tent to make the choice. 
C. 	 The procedure that must be followed in arriving at that 
decision.66 
With respect to the first and second inquiries, the court deter­
mined that the ward's right to refuse chemotherapy was a fundamen­
tal right of privacy; a right that must be weighed against the 
appropriate state interests.67 With respect to the third inquiry, con­
cerning the mechanics of articulating the determined right under the 
first and second inquiries in order to determine the choice that the 
ward would make, the court applied the substituted judgment doc­
trine.68 As part of the substituted judgment procedure, the court 
held that such decisions are to be made through judicial resolu­
tions.69 In reaching such judicial resolution, the court balanced nine 
factors that were either for or against treatment1° against certain 
countervailing state interests.71 In arriving at a substituted judg­
ment, of the nine factors considered,72 the expressed interests and 
preferences of the ward were given the greatest weight.73 
In Dinnerslein, the mentally ill ward was a sixty-seven year old 
woman suffering from the advanced stages of Alzheimer's Disease, a 
66. Id. at 736, 370 N.E.2d at 422-23. The nature of this right includes a serious 
look at what are the mentally ill ward's best interests in each situation, id. at 737, 370 
N.E.2d at 423, an implicit recognition by the state "that a person has a strong interest in 
being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity.", id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 
424, which must be weighed against the following state interests: I) the preservation of 
life, 2) the protection of innocent third panies; 3) the prevention of suicide and 4) main­
taining the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. 
Also, "The 'substituted judgement' standard which has been described commends 
itself simply because of its straightforward respect for the integrity and autonomy of the 
individual." Id. at 75 I, 370 N.E.2d at 43 \. 
Finally, in situations where life-prolonging treatment is needed, it is appropriate for 
a guardian to petition the probate coun for such an order. Id. at 756, 370 N.E.2d at 433. 
A guardian ad litem is generally appointed to conduct a thorough investigation of the 
matter. Id. at 757, 370 N.E.2d at 433, and the judge shall make a decision applying the 
facts of the investigation to a substituted judgment. Id. at 757, 370 N.E.2d at 434. 
67. 	 Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427. 
68. 	 Id. at 751, 370 N.E.2d at 43\. 
69. 	 Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435. 
70. 	 Id. at 752-54, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32. 
71. 	 Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. 
72. 	 Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 43 \. 
73. 	 Id. 
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form of senility.74 She was in a vegetative state,75 with no hope of 
recovery and a life expectancy of appropriately one year.76 Here, the 
court ended its inqu.iry at steps A and B of the Saikewicz analysis, 
having found that judicial resolution was unnecessary under the in­
stant facts. 
In its analysis, the court stated that "[p]rolongation of life as 
used in the Saikewicz case does not mean a mere suspension of the 
act of dying, but contemplates at the very least, a remission of symp­
toms enabling a return towards a normal functioning, integrated 
existence."77 The court held that the "question is n6t one for judicial 
decision, but one for attending physician"78 because the "case [did] 
not . . . present the type of significant treatment choice or election 
[as in Sallcewlcz] which, in light of sound medical advice, is to be 
made by the patient, if competent to do SO."79 
In Spring, the issue was whether a guardian had the right to 
terminate hemodialyis, a kidney treatment, for the mentally ill ward; 
a seventy-eight year old man suffering. from kidney disease.so The 
ward also suffered. from chronic organic brain syndrome, a form of 
senility.sl Both conditions were considered permanent and irrevers­
ible.s2 The court found that the facts and legal principles involved 
were similar to Saikewicz. 83 In its analysis, the court enunciated 
fifteen factors that were to be considered in making a substituted 
judgment.84 The court, however, gave no relative weight to any of 
the factors. 85 The court affirmed the need of a court order in situa­
tion of life-prolonging treatment and required the application of 
substituted judgment to situations86 involving life-prolonging medi­
74. 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 466-67, 380 N.E.2d iii 134-35. 
75. Id at 467, 380 N.E.2d at 135. 
76. Id at 468, 380 N.E.2d at 135. It was the physician's recommendation "[t]hat 
when (and if) cardiac or respiratory arrest occurs, resuscitation effons should not be un­
denaken." Id . 
77. Id at 472-73, 380 N.E.2d at 138. 
78. Id at 475, 380 N.E.2d at 139. 
79. Id at 474, 380 N.E.2d at 139. 
80. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1211-12,405 N.E.2d at 118. 
81. Id at 1212,405 N.E.2d at 118. 
82. Id 
83. Id at 1216,405 N.E.2d at 120. 
84. Id at 1216-17, 405 N.E.2d at 121. 
85. In the end, however, the coun appeared more concerned, in coming to its sub­
stituted judgment, with the immediate suffering of the ward and his uncooperativeness in 
the administration of the treatment. Id at 1220,405 N.E.2d at 122. Neither of the above 
two factors were expressly enunciated as one of the fifteen factors set out by the coun 
earlier in the opinion. See Id at 1216-17,405 N.E.2d at 121. 
86. Id at 1214.405 N.E.2d at 119. 
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cal treatment where the chance of remission exists. 
Saikewicz, ,Dinnerstein, and Spring recognized the possible need 
to adjudicate the rights of mentally ill or retarded wards with respect 
to life-prolonging treatment.87 The decisions also noted that the in­
trusive nature of life-prolonging treatment infringes upon the right 
of privacy of mentally ill or retarded wards,88 and that the facts of 
Saikewicz and Spring give rise to a need for application of substi­
tuted judgment, which must be balanced against countervailing state 
interests.89 
B. The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication 
Parens patriae90 may also be exercised by the state to protect 
those individuals with mental illness who are unable to care for 
themselves, although they may be legally competent.91 This inherent 
state authority is effectuated primarily through the civil commitment 
statute.92 
. In recent years, the doctrine ofparens patriae has been limited 
in the mental health setting by the least restrictive alternative doc­
trine: "In essence, . . . the least restrictive alternative doctrine 
means that if there are a number of equally effective means of 
87. See supra notes 60-86 and accompanying text. 
88. "The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of the 
sanctity of individual free choice and self determination as fundamental constituents of 
life." 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426. Although the court professes that this is a 
state constitutional right of privacy, it relies heavily on the common law tort doctrine that 
a person has a strong interest in being free from the nonconsensual invasion of his bodily 
integrity, id at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424, and the federal constitutional right of privacy 
established in Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), to establish the above described right of privacy under Massachusetts law. See 
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1000 n.9, 421 N.E.2d at 51 n.9. 
89. It is interesting to note that Massachusetts has a body of unreported case law 
dealing with the state statutes concerning minor incompetents, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 201, §§ 2, 3, 4,5 (West Supp. 1981) (minor incompetents), and their right as donors to 
refuse organ and tissue donation, Baron, Botsford & Cole, Life Organ and Tissue Trans­
plants from Minor J)onor in Massachusells, 55 B. U.L. Rev. 159 (1975). an intrusive medi­
cal procedure dealt with in the Strunk case, see supra note 157. The pattern of these 
cases is that the courts have only applied the "substituted judgment" doctrine once. Rap­
paport v. Stott, No. 574-57 (Mass. Aug. 28, 1974), and in all instances the transplants 
have been allowed, Baron, Botsford & Cole, supra, at 162. Why the Massachusetts courts 
have dealt so disparately with such analogous areas of guardianship law is unknown. It 
does, however, raise an interesting equal protection question as to why some incompe­
tents are afforded greater rights than other incompetents in significantly similar situa­
tions. See supra note 63. 
90. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
91. See Custer, The Origins ofthe J)octrine of "Parens Palr/oe", 27 EMORY L.J. 195 
(1978). 
92. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 (West Supp. 1982). 
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achieving the same ends, the solution which allows the greatest de­
gree of fundamental liberty should be chosen."93 The major thrust of 
the doctrine in mental health law94 is to avoid unwarranted depriva­
tion of liberty95 through civil commitment to a state hospital. 
The competing interests ofparens patriae and the least restric­
tive alternative doctrine present a difficult problem in determining a 
mentally ill individual's right' to refuse antipsychotic medication.96 
Unlike confinement involved in civil commitment, which is a physi­
cal restraint, the administration of antipsychotic medication is a 
chemical restraint.97 In an action to civilly commit a mentally ill 
individual, certain procedural due process steps must be taken to 
avoid an unnecessary loss of liberty.98 
A loss of liberty, however, also accompanies the use of chemical 
restraints. In Rogers v. Okin ,99 the Federal District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts held that, absent an emergency, an individ­
ual with mental illness has a constitutionally protected right to refuse 
the forced administration of antipsychotic medication as guaranteed 
by the·right of privacyJ()() and the first amendment freedom of ex­
pression. IOI Rogers was reversed in part by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit. There, the court held that individu­
als with mental illness do not have an absolute right to refuse antip­
93. MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL ADVISORS COMMITTEE, MANUAL FOR MENTAL DIS­
ABILITIES PROFESSIONALS, pan V, app. F (1977). See Chambers, Allernalives 10 Chil 
Commilmenl of Ihe Menla/~v III,' Praclkal Guides 'and Conslilulional Imperalives. 70 
MICH. L REV. 1107, 1145 (1971-72). 
94. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C Cir. 1969). 
95. la 
96. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123. § I (West Supp. 1982) (definition of 
restraints ). 
97. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1018.421 N.E.2d at 60. 
98. See supra note 18. 
99. 478 F.Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in pari, rev'd in parI, 634 F.2d 650 (1st 
CiT. 1980), vacared and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (l982). 
100. la at. 1365-66. 
101. la at 1366-67. Cf Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 942 (N.D. Ohio 1980) 
(the opinion of the coun stated a preference for resting its holding of an individual's right 
to refuse antipsychotic medication on a founeenth amendment due process argument 
rather than a first amendment freedom of expression argument); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. 
Supp. i 131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) (the opinion held that a temporary dulling of the senses 
through the administration of antipsychotic medication does not rise to a first amend­
ment freedom of expression violation), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981). 
This novel approach of assening the individual's right to refuse antipsychotic medi­
cation through the first amendment right of freedom of expression responds to the new 
technologies of behavior control such as antipsychotic medication, psychosurgery, and 
electro-convulsive shock treatment (ECT). Rhoden. The RighI ro Rifuse Psycholropic 
Drugs. 15 HARV. CR.-CL L REV. 363, 389 (1980). 
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sychotic medication. 102 Instead, the right to refuse antipsychotic 
medication must be balanced against competing state interests 
through a procedure that incorporates a mentally ill patient's due 
process rights. 103 Both opinions agree that the use of antipsychotic 
medication on unwilling mentally ill patients is an intrusion upon 
the individual's bodily integrity because of the mind altering effects 
and the potentially harmful side effects of chemical restraints. 104 
The Supreme Court later vacated the decision of the appeals court, 
stating that the right to refuse antipsychotic medication should be 
based on state law.IOS Pending a final decision by the court of ap­
peals, the decision of the federal district court was reinstated. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
One possible option for the supreme judicial court in R.oe was to 
hold simply that the authorization granted by the probate judge, al­
lowing the guardian to consent to the administration of antipsychotic 
medication, was in error because such authorization was not season­
ably requested. Yet foreseeing the probability of future litigation 
and thus the need to clarify the guidelines set out in Saikewicz and 
Spring, the supreme judicial court in Roe went on to extend the doc­
trine of substituted judgment to include not only life-prolonging 
medical treatment lO6 but also "extraordinary medical treatment."I07 
Specifically, the court recognized the right of a noninstitutional­
ized108 mentally ill ward to a judicial determination 109 with respect 
to the acceptance or rejection of antipsychotic medication by his 
guardian. I 10 
Although previous Massachusetts decisions have utilized substi­
102. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1980), vacaled and remanded 
sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982). 
\03. Id at 656. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 942 (N.D. Ohio 1980) 
(the opinion of the court adopts a fourteenth amendment procedural due process argu­
ment to detennine an individual's right to refuse antipsychotic medication). 
104. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1359 (D. Mass. 1979), alfd in parr. rev't/ in 
part, 634 F .2d 650, 653 (1 st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 
102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982). 
105. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982). The Court relied heavily on the Roe' 
opinion in arriving at its holding. Id at 2452. Roe, therefore, will have a significant 
impact on how the appeals court decides the issues in Rogers. See id 
106. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
107. 1981 Mass. Adv Sh. at 1001, 421 N.E.2d at 51. 
108. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
109. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 983, 421 N.E.2d at 42. 
110. Id at 999, 421 N.E.2d at 50. 
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tuted judgment only in those cases with life-prolonging treatment, III 
the supreme judicial court found, in the analyses of Saikewicz and 
Spring, that mentally ill wards have an interest in being free from 
the intrusion of certain extraordinary medical treatmenis. 112 The 
court also relied heavily on the analysis ofRogers and found that th~ 
mind controlling effects of antipsychotic medication fall into the cat­
egory of intrusive medical treatment. I 13 The court in Roe concurred 
with the finding in Rogers that a mentally ill ward's right to refuse 
antipsychotic medication is part of the right of privacy covered by 
the Massachusetts Constitution. 114 
A. 	 The Decision to Administer Antipsychotic Medication: The 
Needjor Judicial Resolution 
The court identified five factors to be considered when deciding 
the appropriateness of a court order to administer antipsychotic 
medication: "( I) [T]he intrusiveness of the proposed treatment, 
(2) the possibility of adverse side effects, (3) the absence of an emer­
gency, (4) the nature and extent of prior judicial involvement, and 
(5) the likelihood ofconfiicting interests." I 15 According to the court, 
the intrusiveness of the proposed treatment has several variables: 
First is whether the drug has a low predictability rate; 116 second is 
whether the drug can immobilize both mind and body; I nand third, 
is whether the drug can be therapeutically abused. In the instant 
case, the court found that. the antipsychotic medication, Haldol, 
could effect a person for up to fourteen days. I IS These facts con­
vinced the court that the treatment was highly intrusive. 
III. 	 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanymg text. 
112. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1000-01. 421 N.E.2d at 51. The supreme judicial court 
may have been better advised to use the term "intrusive medical treatment" rather'than 
"extraordinary medical treatment". The latter term generally refers to two types of treat~ 
ment: I) experimental treatment, where the goal is furthering the knowledge of medical 
science rather than the treatment of the patient and 2) non-validated treatment, where 
the goal is treating the patient using, however, a drug or technique, which is not known 
or proven to be of any value. 
It is arguable that antipsychotic medication falls in the latter category and thus ex­
traordinary medical treatment is not a misnomer in Roe. The term "intrusive medical 
treatment" would be a more accurate term for the purpose of applying the substituted 
judgment doctrine to future cases where the medical treatments are neither experimental 
nor non-validated. 
113. 	 Id 
114. 	 Id at 1000 n.9, 421 N.E.2d at 51 n.9. 
115. 	 Id at 1002, 421 N.E.2d at 52. 
116. 	 Id at 1003-05,421 N.E.2d aJ 53. 
117. 	 Id 
118. 	 Id at 1003,421 N.E.2d at 52-53. 
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The second factor, the possibility of adverse side effects, focuses 
on the variety of potential physical side effects that accompany the 
administration of antipsychotic medication.' The Roe court de­
scribed in fairly specific detail the "grotesque" side effects that may 
result from the administration of Haldol. I19 The court balanced the 
intended effects of antipsychotic medication against their harmful 
side effects as an objective measure of how the incompetent ward 
might make his decision under such circumstances. 120 
The third factor is the absence of an emergency. The Roe court 
adopted the dictionary definition of an emergency, that is, a set of 
unforeseen circumstances calling for immediate action. 121 The court 
went on to note that the facts of the instant case did not fall within 
this definition. The ward's condition might deteriorate, but only 
over "[a]n uncertain but relatively distant ..." time. 122 
The fourth factor, the nature and extent of prior judicial in­
volvement, considers whether a mentally ill individual has had any 
prior judicial determinations regarding his competency to refuse an­
tipsychotic medication. 12l With respect to this factor, the Roe court 
found that the facts of the instant case did not reveal evidence of a 
prior determination made on behalf of the ward. 
The final factor, the likelihood of conflicting interests, considers 
interests of a guardian that may conflict with' the mentally ill ward's 
best interests. 124 Richard's father, as guardian, might have family 
interests that would compete with Richard's interests as an individ­
ual. I25 The cOurt, in such instances, is better able to render an unbi­
ased and objective decision. 126 
The above five factors will vary according to the facts and cir­
cumstances of each decision. 127 Even the supreme judicial court in­
dicated that the factors are not exhaustive. 128 The factors delineated, 
however, do provide a more manageable framework than previous 
119. Id at 1005,421 N.E.2d at 53-54 (the side effects included dystonic reactions 
akathasia, Parkinsonisms, low blood pressure, depression, and weight gain). 
120. Id 
121. Id at 1007,421 N.E.2d at 54 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD INT'L DICTIONARY 
741 (1961» "We accept the dictionary definition of 'emergency': 'an unforeseen combi­
nation of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action' "). See 
supra note 8. 
122. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1007,421 N.E.2d at 54. 
123. Id at 1009,421 N.E.2d at 56. 
124. Id 
125. See infra note 141. 
126. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1010,421 N.E.2d at 56. 
127. Id at 1002,421 N.E.2d at 52. 
128. Id 
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Massachusetts cases from which to decide whether court interven­
tion is necessary to protect a ward from the administration of antip­
sychotic medication. 129 
B. The Substituted Judgment Determination 
If a court order to administer antipsychotic medication is deter­
mined to be required, then the supreme judicial court has identified 
six factors to be considered by the probate court in making a substi­
tuted judgment determination. 130 The relevant factors are: 
"(1) [T]he ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment; (2) his 
religious beliefs; (3) the impact upon the ward's family; (4) the 
probability of adverse side effects; (5) the consequences if treatment 
is refused; and (6) the prognosis with treatment."131 
The first factor, the mentally ill ward's expressed preferences re­
garding treatment, is entitled to much weight in making a substituted 
judgment because this factor finds strong support in Massachusetts 
case law 132 as well as in the facts of the instant case. The ward had 
expressed several times while legally competent that he did not wish 
to take antipsychotic medication. 133 The court noted that even in 
situations where an individual had been found legally incompetent 
and in need of a guardian, a court should still give serious considera­
tion to the mentally ill ward's expressed preferences. 134 Thus, the 
fact that the word had steadfastly rejected antipsychotic medication 
before and after he was adjudged legally incompetent was to figure 
highly in the court's decision. 
The second factor, religious beliefs, are accorded weight equal 
to the "[t]enacity with which an individual may adhere to his reli­
gious beliefs."135 In determining the validity of a person's beliefs, the 
supreme judicial court adopted the three factors set out by the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of In re Boyd: 136 
[W)betber the objection, if religious, is a recognizable, estab­
129. See supra notes 70, 84 and accompanying text. 
130. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1011,421 N.E.2d at 56. 
131. Id. at 1011-12.421 N.E.2d at 57. 
132. See 377 Mass. at 279, 385 N.E.2d at 1000. "Although [the ward] failed to 
understand his mental condition and hisneed for treatment, we think his stated prefer­
ence must be treated as a critical factor in the determination of his 'best interests'." Id. 
See also Allis v. Morton, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 63, 64 (1855) (in determining the need for 
guardianship. the happiness of the wiud should be considered). 
133. See supra notes 13. 20-22 and accompanying text. 
134. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1012,421 N.E.2d at 57. 
135. Id. at 1013,421 N.E.2d at 57. 
136. 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979). 
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lished one, such as the well-known views of a Jehovah's Witness 
of Christian Scientist; whether the individual has acted upon these 
views in ways that demonstrate they have been deeply felt; and 
whether these views have been long held, perhaps as a matter of 
family tradition, or if more recently adopted, have been the result 
of demonstrable experience, such as a religious conversion, which 
would justify a court's conclusion that the views are 
unequivocal. 137 
In the instant case, the ward's adherence to the tenets of Chris­
tian Science was based on a book that the probate court found he 
could not understand. 138 His objection to medication, based on reli­
gious grounds, did not hold great significance under the instant 
circumstances. 
The third factor recognized the "desire to minimize the burden 
on ... [the mentally ill ward's] family, ..."139 particularly in terms 
of financial and emotional stress. The court considered the manner 
in which a legally competent individual would weigh the concerns in 
making a decision about treatment with antipsychotic medication, 
although the court was unclear as to how the ward's expressed pref­
erences would effect his family financially and emotionally; 140 nor 
did the opinion of the court indicate how much weight this factor 
was accorded in the instant case. 141 
The fourth factor, the probability of adverse side effects, relates 
to "the severity of these side effects, the probability that they would 
occur, and the circumstances in which they would be endured."142 
Grotesque side effects, such as tardive dyskinesia, were. described 
earlier in the opinion. 143 In the instant case, Richard would have 
been required to endure the mind altering effects of one injection of 
Haldol, which could last up to fourteen days.l44 This factor figured 
prominently in the Roe court's decision. 
The fifth factor, the consequences of refused treatment, pertains 
137. ld at 752. 
138. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
139. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1013,421 N.E.2d at 58. 
140. Id at 1013,421 N.E.2d at 58. 
141. The court may have concluded, without stating so in the opinion, that the 
ward may not have considered this factor if competent. See id at 1013,421 N.E.2d at 58. 
On the other hand, the court may have ignored this factor as to the facts of Roe 
because of the family problems caused by the ward's illnes. Appendix to Brief for Appel­
lant at App. 24, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981) (subsidiary findings of the 
probate court 15-19). 
142. Id at 1014,421 N.E.2d at 58. 
143. Id at 1005-07, 421 N.E.2d at 53-54. See supra note 119. 
144. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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to the choice that a legally competent individual would make if he 
were to balance the irreversible deterioration ultimately occurring 
without treatment against the favorable prognosis resulting from 
proper treatment. 145 The court found the effect of the ward's refusal 
to take antipsychotic medication could not be conclusively estab­
lished and instead lead to speculative conclusions as to both deterio­
ration andirreversibility.I46 . 
The sixth factor, the prognosis with treatment, considers the 
"general proposition that the greater the likelihood that there will be 
cure or improvement, the more likely an individual would be to sub­
mit to intrusive treatment accompanied by the possibility of adverse 
side effects."147 Under this consideration, it is the responsibility of 
the judge to determine the effects of the drug treatment and the· 
probability that the mentally ill ward will be benefited. 148 In Roe, the 
supreme judicial court discussed the unpredictable nature of antip­
sychotic medication and thus the uncertainty of whether the ward 
would benefit from such treatment. 149 
The list of factors above, to be considered in making a substi­
tuted judgment determination, provides a manageable framework 
that will assist probate court judges in making appropriate and con­
sistent decisions concerning the use of antipsychotic medication on 
mentally ill wards. If the substituted judgment determination is that 
the mentally ill ward would not take antipsychotic medication, the 
court must weigh that decision against the appropriate state inter­
ests. 150 The supreme judicial court relied on Saikewicz for those 
state interests that might override a substituted judgment that the 
ward, if competent, would not take the medication.I 51 They are 
"( I) [T]he preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of 
innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide, and (4) main­
taining the ethical integrity of the medical profession."152 The sec­
ond state interest was pertinent because of the ward's history of 
violence toward individuals in the community.1S3 For the state inter­
est to override a mentally ill ward's substituted judgment to refuse 
antipsychotic medication, the likelihood of serious harm to third 
145. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1014,421 N.E.2d at 58. 
146. fd. at 1O.J7, 421 N.E.2d at 54. 
147. fd. at 1015,421 N.E.2d at 585-9 (footnote omitted). 
148. fd. at 1015,421 N.E.2d at 59. 
149. fd. at 1003-4,421 N.E.2d at 53. 
150. fd. at 1016.421 N.E.2d at 59. 
lSI. fd. See 373 Mass. at 741,370 N.E.2d at 425. 
152. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1016,421 N.E.2d at 59. 
153. fd. at 1017-18.421 N.E.2d at 60. 
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parties must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ls4 
Finally, should the state meet the preceding standard, the Roe 
court concluded that the state has two means of protecting its inter­
ests: involuntary commitment to a state facility or forced adminis­
tration of antipsychotic medication. ISS To determine which is 
appropriate, the judge must decide through an "extended substituted 
judgment" the alternative that serves as a lesser intrusive means of 
restraint and, as well, provides adequate protection to the public. ls6 
The court's finding was particularly significant because its analysis 
includes the idea that civil commitment and involuntary administra­
tion of antipsychotic medication equally infringe on the same per­
sonal liberties. ls7 The decision strongly suggested that, in 
Massachusetts, the administration of antipsychotic medication 
should no longer be considered a less restrictive form of restraint 
than physical restraint. IS8 
In sum, the supreme judicial court has arrived at a set of guide­
lines to: (1) determine if a court order is needed; (2) make the substi­
tuted judgment if step one is answered in the affirmative; and 
(3) determine if the countervailing state interests could override that 
substituted judgment. Particular attention must be given to the in­
trusiveness of antipsychotic medication and whether adequate treat­
ment could be achieved through less restrictive means. 
In Roe, the supreme judicial court limited the use of these 
guidelines to cases involving noninstitutionalized mentally ill wards 
whose guardians wish to consent to the administration of antip­
sychotic medication. ls9 
V. THE IMPACT OF ROE: INCREASING RIGHTS OF LEGALLY 

INCOMPETENT IN MASSACHUSETTS 

Roe is a pivotal casein the area of substituted judgment. 160 Pre­
vious decisions have considered the application of the doctrine 161 
154. Id at 1018,421 N.E.2d at 60. See Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. 
Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 275-77, 372 N.E.2d 242,245-46 (1978). 
155. Id at 1019,421 N.E.2d at 6J. 
156. Id 
157. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1018,421 N.E.2d at 60. 
158. Taken further, the decision could also imply that a guardian could seek the 
authority to commit to a state facility or the authority to consent to the administration of 
antipsychotic medication, but not both. See id 
159. Id at 102-022. 421 N.E.2d at 61-62. 
160. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 60-89 and accompanying text. 
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only to life-prolonging treatment. 162 Roe, however, has expanded the 
doctrine to include extraordinary medical treatment, a much broader 
category than life-prolonging treatment. 163 Although the supreme ju­
dicial court limited the extraordinary medical treatment category, 
for the present, to the use of antipsychotic medication, it did so only 
because of the difficulties in formulating a definitive set of guidelines 
to deal with the entire spectrum of medical treatment, as well as the 
diverse circumstances under which treatment could be delivered. l64 
The generalized category of extraordinary medical treatment, com­
bined with the Roe court's analysis and sweeping language16S sug­
gests, however, that the supreme judicial court is breaking ground 
for use of the substituted judgment doctrine beyond the category of 
antipsychotic medication. 166 Any type of medical treatment that ar­
guably is intrusive upon the ward's right of privacy in the integrity of 
his body could be litigated under the substituted judgment doctrine. 
This category could include, not only dangerous and irreversible 
medical procedures such as sterilization,167 organ transplants, or 
electo-convulsive shock treatment, but also such routine medical 
procedures as tooth extractions or appendectomies. Indeed, the lan­
162. See JUpra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
163. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1000-01,421 N.E.2d at 51. 
164. Id. at \022,421 N.E.2d at 62. 
165. Note in the outline of the court's guidelines below that the language of each of 
the headings and subheadings avoid any reference to antipsychotic medication or treat­
ment. In fact they make no reference to an)' specific type of medical treatment. 
Outline 
A. Need for a Court Order. 
(I) The intrusiveness of the proposed treatment. 
(2) The possibility of adverse side effects. 
(3) The absence of an emergency. 
(4) The nature and extent of prior judicial involvement. 
(5) The likelihood of confiicting interests. 
B. Relevant Factors in the Substituted Judgment Determination. 
(I) The ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment. 
(2) The ward's religious beliefs. 
(3) The impact upon the ward's family. 
(4) The probability of adverse side effects. 
(5) The consequences if treatment is refused. 
(6) The prognosis with treatment. 
C. The Accommodation of Overriding State Interests. 
Id. at 1000·16,421 NE.2d at 51-59. 
166. See JUpro notes 163-65 and accompanying text. 
167. In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555,432, N.E.2d 712 (1982). "[Sjterilization is an ex­
traordinary and highly intrusive form of medical treatment that irreversibly extinguishes 
the ward's fundamental right of procreative choice, we conclude that a guardian must 
obtain a proper judicial order for the procedure before he or she can validly consent to 
it." Id. at 539, 432 N.E.2d at 716-17. 
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guage of Roe is flexible enough to afford the application of substi­
tuted judgment to the everchanging technologies of medical science. 
Roe also provides a manageable procedural framework by 
which probate court judges may reach accurate and consistent deci­
sions involving the substituted judgment doctrine. 168 At the same 
time, these guidelines are not exhaustive and a probate judge may 
exercise his discretion where the facts of a particular case require a 
different analysis. 169 As a practical matter, the guidelines established 
by the supreme judicial court may discourage guardians from indis­
criminately seeking the authority to consent to the administration of 
antipsychotic medication because of the time and expense necessary 
to obtain a judicial order. The result would at least force potential 
guardians to seek out less restrictive means of treating individuals 
with mental illness. 
Although the supreme judicial court has determined that a right 
of privacy exists in a person resisting intrusion upon the integrity of 
his body, 170 Roe was the first case to apply the right of privacy to a 
ward's right to refuse antipsychotic medication. l7l Mentally ill 
wards now have the same right to refuse antipsychotic medication as 
individuals not under guardianship. 172 The difference is how the in­
dividual expresses his right to refuse antipsychotic medication: the 
legally competent individual expresses the right himself, while the 
ward's right is expressed through a probate judge. The new guide­
lines upon which the probate judge's decision must be based effectu­
ate the expanded proteCtion of the ward's right of privacy. 173 The 
Roe opinion, therefore,' has worked to close the gap between guardi­
anship law and mental health law in the State of Massachusetts. 174 
The decision will result in more equalized treatment between those 
individuals with mental illness not under guardianship and those 
who are under guardianship. Both groups are entitled to mental 
health treatment under the least restrictive means. 17S The Roe deci­
sion guarantees that although the ward cannot make the decision 
himself, his right to refuse antipsychotic medication will be respected 
through a rigorous court procedure, much the same as a person who 
168. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1011,21 N.E.2d at 56. 
169. Id. al 1002, 1011,421 N.E.2d at 52, 56. 
170. See supra note 88. 

17!. Id. at 999, 421 N.E.2d at 50. 

172. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1000,421 N.E.2d at 51. 
173. Id. at 1000-01,421 N.E.2d at 51. 
174. Id. at 1019,421 N.E.2d at 61. 
175. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. 
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is not under guardianship. This preserves the same right the ward 
would have had if he had been legally competent, as nearly as 
possible. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prior to Roe, the substituted judgment doctrine was confined to 
life-prolonging medical treatment and the standards used for reach­
ing that judgment were unclear. Roe expanded the doctrine to in­
clude "extraordinary" medical treatment, specifically addressing the 
issues involved in the administration of antipsychotic medication. 
Although the court limited its decision to the facts of Roe, the lan­
guage of the opinion gives the court carte blanche to apply the sub­
stituted judgment doctrine to both known and unknown medical 
treatments when the right factors present themselves. Additionally, 
the language of the opinion helps to close the gap between guardian­
ship law and mental health law by recognizing the need to afford 
mentally ill wards the same rights and privileges that are granted to 
those mentally ill individuals not under guardianship. 
Finally, the supreme judicial court has recognized the intrusive 
nature of antipsychotic medication with respect to the integrity of an 
individual's mind and body. The opinion is a strong statement 
against the use of antipsychotic medication as a less intrusive means 
of treatment than physical restraint and a strong statement concern­
ing the right of every individual to have a choice in preserving the 
integrity of his body. 
Michael J. Stebbins 
